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ABSTRACT 
The cornerstone of plant integrity is ensuring that facilities are correctly designed, and operated 
and maintained within the equipment design envelopes. The profitability of the facilities is 
significantly impacted by the cost-effectiveness of inspection and maintenance strategies and 
programmes in place. Plant equipment is subjected to deterioration mechanisms and potential 
damage throughout their service life. Equipments inspection is very important in order to get the 
right information of the current conditions of the equipments. Risk Based approaches for 
managing inspection programs have emerged during the last decade as useful tools for managing 
risks associated with safety, health, environment and business. With quantitative RBI analysis, it 
is now possible to forecast inspection requirements, demonstrate the effects of inspection and 
facilitate the scheduling of inspection programmes. It is now widely accepted that the traditional 
time-based approach to planned plant inspection by competent person has a number of 
shortcomings. In particular, the use of fixed intervals between inspections may be too 
conservative and lacks the freedom to benefit from good operating experience. The introduction 
of goal setting legislation has facilitated a move towards risk based strategies, which focus 
inspection resources on parts of the plant where they will have the greatest benefit (IET, 2009). 
Throughout this project, RBI tool will be developed by using the provided guideline by 
American Petroleum Institute (API). RBI Tool frameworks for RBI qualitative risk analysis and 
RBI semi-quantitative risk analysis in this report are developed based on API methodology. The 
results from developed RBI Tool are validated by comparing them to the results of RBI from the 
industry. The risks between the two different RBI systems are different for the same case study. 
The different amount of information which is being supplied to the different RBI systems is 
identified as the main reason to the variation. 
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Risk Based Inspection (RBI) as a method for prioritising the inspection of plant has received 
considerable attention over the last few years and methods have been developed nationally, for 
example by the American Petroleum Institute (API) and by a number of private organisations, 
particularly in the petrochemical industry. A co-ordinated approach to these developments is 
underway in Europe (RI. MAP). 
Risk of an accident has two components, likelihood and consequence. Risk may be expressed as 
calculated numerical value. More effective way of presenting risk is to plot probability and 
consequence of failure on a risk matrix. For risk management there are several steps can be done 
for the high risk equipment such as inspection maintenance and repair improvement, reduction 
of consequences, reduction of probability of failure or decommission. Otherwise, only 
monitoring is required. Inspection is an activity intended to limit risk must reduce one or both of 
the risk components. 
RBI is one of the inspection methods and it uses risk as a basis for prioritizing and managing the 
efforts of an inspection program or the quantitative decision making technique for cost-optimum 
inspection planning based on risk comprising the probability of failure and consequence (API 
581,2000). RBI objectives are to focus on what to inspect through the prioritization of high risk 
components, when to inspect by determining degradation mechanisms and how to inspect 
through the selection of best inspection method. In comparison, traditional "time-based 
inspection" has only one date and fixed inspection requirements for all equipment. 
Many plants start to implement RBI because it gives more accurate result in term of the 
reliability of the inspection programme. This is because; most of existing inspection programmes 
are implemented only based on likelihood or consequence of factor. Through RBI, the severity of 
consequence level can be reduced through the right mitigation action in which is cost effective. 
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RBI also helps the engineers to focus more on high risk equipments rather than to waste time, 
energy and cost on low risk equipments. 
The consequence modeling procedure for RBI is a greatly simplified approach to a relatively 
complex discipline. Because of the level of simplification, a large number of assumptions are 
implicit in the procedure in addition to the assumptions that would be part of a more in-depth 
analysis. The important assumptions related to the simplified approach are as below: 
i. The consequence area does not reflect where the damage occurs. 
ii. The use of a fixed set of conditions for meteorology and release orientations is a great 
simplification over detailed consequence calculation because these factors can have a 
significant impact on the result. 
iii. The use of the standardised event trees for consequence outcomes and ignition 
probabilities is a limitation of the RBI method. These factors are very site-specific, 
and the user needs to realize that they are chosen to reflect representative condition 
for petrochemical industry. 
RBI is now known as a well-known method to design inspection programmes but it has only 
been standardised for pressure systems by API 581. When it comes to such items as topside 
structures, there is no such reference. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
In asset and services core management, one of important elements is risk analysis and risk 
management. This element involves maintenance strategy in which requires RBI for maintenance 
engineering co-ordination. However, most of industries do not implement RBI due to its high 
cost in buying RBI software. API has published Risk Based Inspection Based Resource 
Document in which has provided a complete methodology for RBI programme. This 
methodology can be used to develop RBI Tool. 
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1.3 Objective 
To develop a cost-effective Risk Based Inspection (RBI) Tool prototype by using published 
methodology from API 581. 
1.4 Scope of Study 
This tool is developed by using Visual Basic Application (VBA). This RBI 'Tool consists of 
qualitative and semi-quantitative level analysis. This prototype is developed based on 
recommended methodology from API. The methodology only covers for pressurised equipments 
and associated components. 
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RBI considers the probability of failure and its consequences. The technique is intended to get 
better value for money from inspection. RBI is a technique, which is currently being adopted by 
sectors of industry, particularly the refining and petrochemical sectors, to underpin and direct 
planned plant inspection. It is claimed to offer the prospect of cost savings resulting from better 
targeting resources. RBI recognizes that there is little point to spending good money, for 
example, on very frequent inspection of something that is very unlikely to fait, or if it did fail 
would have little financial or safety consequence. In line with the principles of ALARP (as low 
as reasonably practicable) the money saved may be better spent elsewhere. Savings can also arise 
from reduced direct inspection costs (IET, 2007). Risk-Based Inspection Risk Based Inspection 
(RBI) studies define inspection programs. Information is generated on the types of damage that 
may be expected, appropriate inspection techniques to be used, where to look for potential 
damage, and how often inspections should take place. Risk Based Inspection (RBI) is regarded 
as cost effective alternative to traditional inspection. Risk Based Inspection (RBI) is used for 
planning and implementation of inspection and maintenance programmes. History tells that 80% 
of the risk industrial plants in general are related to 20% of the pressure equipment. To be more 
efficient with inspections and maintenance, it is useful to identify this 20% higher risk assets. 
PETRONAS has been successful in implementing RBI for platform structures and for 
mechanical piping. Number of planned comprehensive inspection for platform structures have 
been reduced from 117 to only 59 after the implementation of RBI procedure (A. Raman, 2007). 
Traditional inspection planning is time based. All equipments received essentially the same 
inspection effort. The inspections focused primarily on visual examination which means that it's 
incapable of detecting many of the most likely degradation mechanisms such as stress corrosion 
cracking (SCC), embrittlement, hydrogen damage, creep and etc. Sometimes, hydro-testing was 
specified in some instances. Even though it serves as a proof test, but it has little value in 
determining deterioration rate and it may actually initiate corrosion. It does not prove fitness for 
continued service. Moreover the inspection method focused on vessels but most failures are 
associated with piping. 
There are lot of companies have taken initiative by developing in-house RBI tool. These can 
provide the RBI team with a model for the assessment and ranking of risk. Packages vary in 
complexity but generally follow the semi-quantitative risk assessment methodology. The RBI 
software packages have been successfully developed by the following suppliers: 
" Akzo Nobel 
" Det Norsk Veritas (DNV) 
" The Welding Institute (TWI) has developed RiskWise 
" Tischuk has developed T-OCA 
" LMP Technical Services has developed PRIME-RBI Module 
A survey of approximately 50 UK organisations showed that approximately half were using an 
approach to plant inspection based on risk (W. Geary, 1999). It was clear however, that a wide 
range of systems were in use including commercial software packages and in-house systems 




3.1 Risk Analysis 
At its core, RBI is a hybrid technique that combines the two disciplines of risk analysis and 
mechanical integrity (API 580,2002). Some of the techniques of RBI are similar to those seen in 
traditional risk analysis, but the two are interchangeable. In its elemental form, a risk analysis is 
comprised of five tasks: 
i. System definition 
ii. Hazard identification 
iii. Probability assessment 
iv. Consequence analysis 
v. Risk results 
Some of the phases of a risk analysis are treated differently in a RBI program. For example, 
while hazard identification is a critical step in a traditional risk analysis, the RBI program 
focuses on the pressure boundary of a unit, and it assumes that failures are due to identifiable 
mechanisms of degradation in that boundary. Secondary causes of leak, such as instrument 
failures or human errors, are included implicitly in the RBI program's treatment of management 
systems, while a traditional risk analysis would account for these failures in explicit terms. The 
major focus of a traditional risk analysis is to evaluate a variety of scenarios that may lead to 
undesirable outcomes. Both the likelihood and the magnitude of these outcomes are estimated 
and displayed as results. In a risk analysis, a scenario represents the set of events that can result 
in an undesirable outcome. Depending on the nature of the process and the detail of the study, a 
risk analysis may include thousands of different scenarios. The risk analysis would evaluate both 
the likelihood and the consequence of the set of events in each scenario. In RBI, likelihood and 
consequence are also evaluated, but for a carefully defined and limited number of scenarios. 
6 
The probability assessment is conducted to estimate the probability of occurrence for the 
scenarios identified. If a scenario occurs fairly frequently, it is best to use historical data to 
estimate the event's probability. However, it is often the case in the petroleum industry that the 
events of concern are so rare that sufficient data does not exist to estimate their probability based 
on historical data alone. When historical data is lacking, a building-block approach is used. 
Probability estimates for all elements of the scenario are obtained and combined to predict 
overall scenario probability. The most common measure of probability for a scenario is its 
frequency. Frequency can be used for a single event or a series of events. Typically, a year is 
used as the standard time interval for a frequency analysis. To obtain the frequency of the 
scenario (FSCenaý,, ), multiply the frequency of leak (FL,,, k) by the probability of all events that 
follow (Pý,,,, 
C1Me 
). The resulting likelihood is the scenario's frequency. The mathematical 




(). tcome (Equation I) 
The consequence of release from process equipment or pipework vary depending on such factors 
as physical properties of the material, its toxicity or flammability, weather conditions, release 
duration and mitigation actions. The effects may impact plant personnel or equipment, 
population in the nearby residences, and the environment. Hazardous consequences are estimated 
in five phases: 
1. Discharge 
2. Dispersion 
3a. Flammable Effects 
3b. Toxic Effects 
3c. Environmental Effects 
Depending on the material released, only one of the three effects (3a-3c) is usually calculated, 
although all of them may be possible with releases of certain mixtures. In traditional risk 
analysis, there is no single way to measure or present an estimate of the risk of operating a 
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chemical process. Historically, a number of measures have been used to express risk in the 
context of a risk analysis. Risks to people are normally presented in one of three ways: 
i. Risk Indices 
ii. Individual Risk Measures 
iii. Societal Risk 
The consequence analysis in an RBI program is performed to aid establishing a relative ranking 
of equipment items on the basis of risk. An overview of the RBI consequence calculation is 
shown in Figure 1. 
Fluid Properties: In 
Equipnent and at 
Ambient Conditions 



















Figure 1: Overview of RBI Consequence Calculation 
Range of Hole Sizes: 






The consequences of releasing hazardous fluid are estimated in following steps: 
[I ] Determining representative fluid and its properties 
[2] Selecting a set of hole sizes, to find the possible range of consequences in the risk 
calculation 
[3] Estimating the total amount of fluid available for release 
[4] Estimating the potential release rate 
[5] Defining the type of release, to determine the method used for modeling the dispersion 
and consequence 
[6] Selecting the final phase of the fluid, i. e., liquid or a gas 
[7] Evaluating the effect of post-leak response 
[8] Determining the area potentially affected by the release, or the relative cost of the leak 
due to down time or environmental clean up 
3.2 Qualitative Level in RBI Tool 
RBI Tool is developed by using the simple workbook approach in API 581 with the philosophy 
that a typical refinery can be assessed in a few hours. 
In qualitative level for RBI Tool, the risk is used to examine refinery and petrochemical 
operations for process hazards associated with pressure equipment integrity. The qualitative is 
similar to that of the quantitative analysis except that the qualitative approach requires less detail 
and is far less time consuming. The results are not as precise as those of the quantitative analysis 
and it can be used as basis for prioritizing a risk based inspection program 
The analysis can be performed at any of the following levels: 
i. An operating unit 
ii. A major area or functional section in an operating unit 
iii. A system 
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The procedures have three functions: 
i. Screening the units within the site to select the level of analysis needed and to 
ascertain the benefit of further analysis 
ii. Rating the degree of risk within the units and assigning them to a position within 
a risk matrix 
iii. Identifying areas of potential concern at the plant, which may merit enhanced 
inspection programs 
The analysis first determines a factor representing the likelihood of failure within the area, then a 
factor for the consequences. The two are then combined in the risk matrix to produce a risk 
rating for the unit. 
In likelihood category, there are six factors need to be evaluated and each factor is weighted, and 
their combination results in the likelihood factor. This factor is plotted on the vertical axis of the 
risk matrix. The six subfactors that make up the likelihood category are as follows: 
i. Amount of equipment (Equipment Factor, EF) 
ii. Damage mechanisms (Damage Factor, DF) 
iii. Appropriateness of inspection (Inspection Factor, IF) 
iv. Current equipment condition (Condition Factor, CCF) 
v. Nature of the process (Process Factor, PF) 
vi. Equipment design (Mechanical Design Factor, MDF) 
The sum of these six components establishes the overall likelihood factor. The likelihood 
category is then assigned based on the overall likelihood factor. 
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Table l: Assignment Value of Likelihood Category for Qualitative Level Analysis 





51 to 75 5 
For consequence category, there are two major potential hazards are considered: 
i. Fire and explosion and 
ii. Toxic risk. 
In determining the toxic consequence, RBI considers only the acute erects. These 
determinations are usually made for each chemical. Many chemicals, however, exhibit a 
predominate risk (fire or explosion or toxicity); thus if the predominant risk for a given chemical 
is known, it is necessary to determine only the factor for that risk not for both. The consequence 
that generates the highest letter category is used to determine the qualitative risk rating. If there 
are several chemicals present in relatively large percentages in the area, the user should conduct 
the exercise several times; once for each of the chemicals present in relatively large proportions. 
A good rule of thumb is to review the chemicals with high health consequence, plus those that 
comprise at least 90-95% of the total mass of chemicals in the area. 
The damage consequence category is derived from a combination of five elements that determine 
the magnitude of a fire and/or explosion hazard: 
i. Inherent tendency to ignite (Chemical Factor, CF) 
ii. Quantity that can be released (Quantity Factor, QF) 
iii. Ability to flash a vapor (State Factor, SF) 
iv. Possibility of auto-ignition (Auto-Ignition Factor, AF) 
v. Effects of higher pressure operations (Pressure Factor, PRF) 
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vi. Engineered safeguards (Credit Factor, CRF) 
vii. Degree of exposure to damage (Damage Potential Factor, DPF) 
The sum of these seven components establishes the overall damage consequence factor. The 
damage consequence category is then assigned based on the overall damage consequence factor. 
Table 2: Assignment Value of Damage Consequence Category for Qualitative Level Analysis 






The health consequence category is derived from the following elements that are combined to 
express the degree of a potential toxic hazard in a unit: 
i. Quantity and toxicity (Toxic Quantity Factor, TQF) 
ii. Ability to disperse under typical process conditions (Dispersibility Factor, 
DIF) 
iii. Detection and mitigation systems (Credit Factor, CRF) 
iv. Population in vicinity of release (Population Factor, PPF) 
The sum of these seven components establishes the overall damage consequence factor. The 
health consequence category is then assigned based on the overall damage consequence factor. 
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Table 3: Assignment Value of Health Consequence Category for Qualitative Level Analysis 






The likelihood category rating and the highest rating form either the damage or the health 
consequence categories are used to place each unit within a five-by-five risk matrix, shown in 
Figure 2. When results are plotted on the matrix, they give an indication of the level of risk for 
the unit being evaluated. When the qualitative analysis has included several materials or a multi- 
component mixture, the unit receiving the highest risk component will be the best indicator of 
whether further evaluation is necessary, as well as the urgency of that evaluation. 
Figure 2: Five-by- Five Risk Matrix 
The risk matrix results can be used to locate areas of potential concern and to decide which 
portions of the process unit need the most inspection attention or other methods of risk reduction. 
It can also be used to decide whether a full quantitative study is justified. The shadings are not 
symmetrical, as they are based on the assumption that, in almost every case, the consequence 
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factor will carry more weight in determining total risk than will the likelihood component. 
Without the shading, it seems clear that, as the plotted value for the likelihood and consequence 
categories moves toward the upper right of the matrix, the amount of risk increases. Companies 
generally will develop and apply their own criteria to determine when it becomes necessary to 
perform a quantitative RBI or adjust their inspection practices. 
3.3 Semi-Quantitative Level in RBI Tool 
Semi-quantitative analysis is simplified approach than quantitative analysis (determination 
inventory amounts, excluding business interruption & environmental consequence, considering 
only Technical Module Sub-Factor (TMSF) for likelihood analysis). The semi-quantitative 
analysis typically requires the same data as quantitative analysis but generally not as detailed. 
For example, the fluid volumes may be estimated. Although the precision of the analysis may be 
less, the time required for data gathering and analysis will be less too. 
The petrochemical industry lacks a specific experience database in regards to failure frequency 
categorized by equipment type and specific process environment. As a result, there is a 
modification of generic failure frequency for each equipment type by a factor related to the type 
of potential in-service degradation occurring in the particular service and the type of inspection 
and/ or monitoring performed. The term "Technical Module" is to describe the methodology by 
which this modification factor is calculated. The following Technical Modules is embedded in 
the developed system: 
i. Thinning 
ii. Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC) 
iii. High Temperature Hydrogen Attack (HTHA) 
iv. Furnace Tubes 
v. Mechanical Fatigue (piping only) 
vi. Brittle Fracture 
vii. Equipment Linings 
viii. External Damage 
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These Technical Modules cover the general procedures for handling the degradation type and 
detailed supplemental technical information for specific degradation mechanisms. The Technical 
Modules have built into them the ability for updating the modification factor (referred to as the 
"Technical Module Subfactor or TMSP") based on the most recent inspection and monitoring 
information available. If more than one of the general damage types are potentially present, the 
individual TMSF are additive. For example: 
TMSF,. h;,, n, ng + 
TMS'ýCC + TMSF,,,. F, A 
If the Furnace Module is used for determination of TMSF,;,,,,,,,,, the TMSF,,. n, nu« should replace 
TMSF,. h, n,,; ng 
j or example: 
TMSFi 
urnace +T 
MSFSý., .+ TMSF! ITIIA 
The overall equation for determining the cumulative TMSF is: 
+ TMSF F, nnl = 
TMSF Thinning + TMSF X. (. + TMSF 111*11A 
TMSF Farigne + TMSF ,,,: + TMSF Lining* + TMSF F, 'zrerna( (Equation 2) 
* The smaller of TMSFj,,,, A or 
TMSF,. h, nn, ng should 
be used if both are active. 
The Technical Modules are intended to support the RBI methodology by providing a screening 
tool to determine inspection priorities, and to optimize inspection efforts. The Technical Modules 
do not provide a definitive "Fitness for Service" assessment of the equipment involved. The 
basic function of the module is to statistically evaluate the amount of damage that may be present 
and the effectiveness of inspection activity. The Technical Module Subfactors calculated are 
based on probability theory, but are not intended to reflect the actual probability of failure for the 
purposes of reliability analysis. The Technical Module Subfactors calculated are based on 
probability of failure for the purposes of reliability analysis. The Technical Module Subfactors 
reflect a relative level of concern about the equipment based on the assumptions of the module. 
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All equipments should be considered for thinning and SCC. Simple screening questions at the 
beginning of HTHA, Furnace, Brittle Fracture, Mechanical Fatigue, External Damage, and 
Lining modules are used to determine whether these modules apply. The purpose of the technical 
modules is to determine a technical module subfactor based on equipment specific knowledge 
such as measured corrosion rate to SCC based on experience and/or inspection history. 
In consequence category, the consequences of releasing a hazardous material are considered and 
estimated in five distinct steps: 
i. Estimate the release rate or the total mass available for release 
ii. Determine if the fluid is dispersed in a rapid manner (instantaneous) or 
slowly (continuous) 
iii. Determine if the fluid disperses in atmosphere as a liquid or gas 
iv. Estimate the impacts of any mitigation system 
v. Estimate the consequences 
Instantaneous releases are those that empty the contents of a vessel in a relatively short period of 
time, as in the case of brittle failure of a vessel. Continuous releases are those that occur over a 
long period of period at relatively constant rate. In the context of the RBI analysis, consequence 
refers to adverse effects on people, equipment, and the environment as a result of outcome. The 
actual outcome of a release depends on the nature and properties of the material released. 
One major simplification in consequence analysis for semi-quantitative level is in determination 
of inventory amounts. Inventories may be estimated on an order of magnitude basis using the 
following guidelines. The inventories can be selected from one of five "order of magnitude" 
categories as shown in Table 4. 
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Table 4: Inventory Category Ranges 
Category Range Value used in calculations 
A 100 to 1000 lbs 500 
B 1000 to 10000 lbs 5000 
C 10000 to 100000 Ibs 50000 
D 100000 to 1000000 lbs 500000 
E 1000000 to 10000000 1 bs 5000000 
The user can select the category based on judgmental evaluation for each category as outlined in 
Table 5. 
Table 5: Description of Inventory Categories 
Category Qualitative Description 
A The release will result in less than total deinventory of the equipment item 
being evaluated 
B The release will result in total deinventory of the equipment item being 
evaluated 
C The release will result in total deinventory of the equipment item being 
evaluated, plus one to ten other equipment items 
D The release will result in total deinventory of the equipment item being 
evaluated, plus ten or more other equipment items 
E The release will result in total deinventory of the unit 
The person performing the analysis still has the option to use any value for the inventory. For 
example, if the inventory has been calculated, this value may be entered. The consequence area 
is calculated for each hole size. To calculate a single overall consequence of failure for each 
equipment item, a "Likelihood Weighted" average area is calculated. This is done by first 
multiplying the consequence area for each hole size by the ratio of the "generic" frequencies for 
all hole sizes. (See Equation 3) 
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Likelihood Weighted Area = 
FREQnn_4 
xAREAn 
FREQn, (Equalion 3 
This ratio determines the "weight" to be given to the calculation area for each hole size 
depending on the relative likelihood of the hole relative to other holes. In this approach, the value 
of each "generic" frequency does not matter, only the relative values of each versus the others. 
The weighted are thus calculated for each hole size is the summed to produce a single 
consequence area value. (See equation 4) This value can be considered to be most likely affected 
area if many events were observed that follow the distribution of generic hole sizes used. 
Likelihood Weighted Average = 
-4 1' REQn JAREAnx 
4 
-' I FREQn 
nI (Equation 4) 
The conversion of the likelihood weighted average area to a consequence category is 
accomplished through a simple assignment of categories to area values. It is possible, depending 
on the assignments chosen, to have an area associated with any category, according to the needs 
of the study. Table 6 is magnitude assignment of areas to categories. 
Table 6: Consequence Area Categories 






Likelihood analysis will be determined by the technical module subfactor. This is the only 
subfactor that is directly affected by inspection and that will form the basis for an inspection 
plan. The conversion of technical module subfactor to a likelihood category is accomplished 
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through a simple assignment of categories to subfactors values. A simple order of magnitude 
assignment was chosen and is illustrated in Table 7. 
Table 7: Technical Module Subfactor Conversion 






The risk analysis for semi-quantitative approach is a straight forward assignment of likelihood 
and consequence to their appropriate categories and placing them in the 5x5 matrix. Different 
areas of the matrix are shaded to illustrate "High", "Medium", "Medium High" and "Low" 
categories of risk. These assignments are shown in Figure 2. 
3.4 Inspection Plan Development 
This strategy is aimed to deliver timely inspections that bring valuable information in the form of 
inspection results. The reduction in component condition uncertainty and increase in 
predictability of deterioration rates translate directly into a reduction in the likelihood of failure. 
The inspection strategy must address the following areas: 
i. Which items are susceptible and where are they located? 
ii. What inspection methods or tools must be adopted in order to deliver the required 
inspection result? 
iii. How effective are the selected inspection methods at detecting the perceived 
degradation mechanisms? 
iv. How much inspection is required in order to assure the target inspection 
effectiveness? 
v. What frequency of inspection is required for each inspectable unit or component? 
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Potential failure modes should be estimated before inspection methods are selected. For each 
failure mode, the potential degradation mechanisms that can cause those failures are identified. 
The evaluation of such mechanisms should consider the type and rate (time dependency) of 
degradation that may be likely. 
A preliminary evaluation of the applicable degradation mechanisms and deterioration rates may 
have been performed during the likelihood estimation in the risk prioritization step. During this 
step, those evaluations should be reconsidered for the higher risk items, and perhaps a more 
detailed assessment may be necessary. Once the degradation mechanisms have been accurately 
assessed, the selection of an inspection method can be successfully achieved. It is important to 
consider that there are many inspection techniques and testing methods available to accurately 
assess component integrity. Appendix C provides a listing of inspection methods available to 
assess common degradation mechanisms. 
3.5 RBI Tool Frameworks 
Both RBI qualitative and semi-quantitative risk analysis are developed based on methodology 
from Risk Based Inspection Based Resource Document, API Publication 581. The concept and 
theory of the methodology has been discussed in Chapter 3 of this report. The frameworks of 
both RBI qualitative and semi-quantitative risk analysis of RB! tool prototype are presented in 
this chapter. 
Figure 3.5.1a to Figure 3.5.1g are frameworks for RBI Qualitative Level Analysis while Figure 
3.5.2a to Figure 3.5.2k are frameworks for RBI Semi-Quantitative Level Analysis. Figure 
3.52f(b) to Figure 3.5.2f(i) are the embedded frameworks for TMSF determination for 
likelihood analysis in RBI semi-quantitative analysis. 
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3.5.1 RBI Qualitative Risk Analysis Framework 
To define the equipment factor: Size of study will 
affect the probability of failure of a component in 
the study. 
EFI=15, full operating unit 
EF2=5, a major section of an operating unit 
EF3 -0, a system or unit operation 
-T- - ----- --- 
Damage factor. To measure risk associated with (mown damage mechanism 
DI 1 -5, Active damage mechanisms that can cause corrosion cracking in carbon or 
low alloy steels 
DF2=4. Potential catastrophic brittle failure including carbon steel materials due to 
low temperature operation or upset conditions, temper cmbrittlement, or materials 
not adequately qualified by impact testing 
DF3 =4, Mechanically thermally-induced fatigue failure has occurred and the 
fatigue mechanism might still be active 
DF4 3, High temperature I lydrogen attack occuring 
DF5=3, Corrosion cracking of austenitic stainless steels occurring as a result of the 
process 
DF6 =3, Localized corrosion is occurring 
1)1; 7=2, General corrosion is occurring 
DF8 1, Creep damage is occurring in high temperature processes, including 
furnace and heaters 
DF9 1, Materials degradation with such mechanisms as sigma phase formation, 
carburization, spheroidization, etc. 
DF10 1, Other active damage mechanisms 
DFl 1 10, Potential damage mechanisms in the operating unit have not been 
evaluated and are not being periodically reviewed by a qualifies materials engineer 
-- -_ --- 
Inspection Factor: To measure the effectiveness of the inspection program by 
identifying the active or anticipated damage 
Vessel Inspection: To gage the effectiveness of vessel inspection program 
IF I- -5, the inspection program is extensive and a variety of inspection methods 
and monitoring are being used 
lF l- -2, formal inspection program is in place and some inspections are being 
done, but primarily visual and UT thickness readings 
IPI= 0, no formal inspection program is in place 
Pipmg Inspection: To gage the effectiveness of vessel inspection program 
IF-2= -5, the inspection program is extensive and a variety of inspection methods 
are being used 
IF2= -2, formal inspection program is in place and some inspections are being 
done, but primarily visual and UT thickness readings 
IF2= 0, no formal inspection_progmut is in place 
Overall Inspection Program: How comprehensive the inspection program design. 
and are the inspection results evaluated and used to modify the inspection program? 
IF3- -5, deterioration mechanisms have been identified for each equipment item 
and the inspection program is modified based on the results of the program using a 
competent inspector or materials engineer 
IF3= -2, inspection program design excludes either identification of failure 
mechanisms or does not include critical evaluation of all inspection results 




Maximum DF is 
20 
r Total IF value cannot exceed 
total DF value 




From Figure 3.5. la Condition Factor. To gage the effectiveness of plant maintenance and ka ekeeping effoit 
Ina plant walktirough. how would the plait housekeeping be judged (including painting and 
insulation 
ntainlenartce programs)? 
Ca. -1 0, significantly better than industry standards 
CCII 2, alwut industry standard 
CCTI ° 5, significantly below industry . land-6 
H 
The quality of plartl design mud custructicxr is: 
C 'F2= 0, significantly better than industry standards, where the owner has used more rigororm standards 
CCF2=2, ahout industry stancarrd, where typical corilract standards were used 
CCF2-5, signifcanaly below industry standards 
In a rcview of the effectiveYtess, fabrication. PM programs, and QA/QC would be judged in plant 
maintenance prognun: 
CCF3 0, signiicatdly better than industry stadards 
CCF3- 2, about iiKhetry standard 
CCF3=5, significantly below indi try standards 
Process Factor To mcastac the potential of almormal operations or upset conditions to result in initiating events 
that a ld Icad to a loss of axnainemcnt 
The number of pLumcd or unplanned proca; s iNaivptiorts in an average year (for nornrul conWmcws 
process openstian): 
Number of operations Pri 
Oto l O 
2to4---_- 1 
5 Ina 3 
9 to 12 4 
more than 12 
Assess the potential for exceeding key process variables in the operation being evaluated 
PF2= 0, the process is extremely stable and no combination of upset conditions is known to exist that 
could cause runaway reaction or other unsafe conditions 
PF2*- 1, only very unusual circumstances could cause upset conditions to escalate into an unsafe 
Conditions 
PF2=-5, possibility of loss of control is inherent in the process 
Assess the p tcntial for protection devices, such as relief devices and c iticnl sensing elements to be 
randered inopcnative as a result of plugging or fouling of te process fluid 
PF3=0, ekan service, no plugging potential 
PF3-1, slgty fooling or plugging potcnüal 
PF3=3, significant fouling or plugging potential 
PF3-5, protective devices have been found impaired in service 
.. 
ý--- Tdal of Candoý 
Factor ý--- 
-- ý---- - 
Total of Process 
Factor 
Go to Figmc3.5.1c 
Figure 3.5.1b 
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From Figure 3.5. lb 
li 
H 
Mechanical Design Factor: To gage certain aspects of the design of the operating equipment 
MDF I 5, Equipment was not designed to the intent of current codes or standards IMDFI 
-2, Equipment is designed and maintained to the ('odes 
in effect at the time it was 
constructed 
MDFI 0, Equipment is designed and maintained to current Codes 
Ml)F2 5, process is unusual or unique or any ofthe process design conditions are extreme 
Extreme design conditions: 
- Pressure exceeding 10000 psi 
-Temperature exceeding 1500 deg F 
- Corrosive conditions requiring high alloy materials (more exotic than 316 
stainless steel) 
Ml)1 2 0, process is common with normal design conditions 
Calculate Total Likelihood Factor: 
Total of Equipment Factor + Total of Damage Factor I Total of Inspection Factor + Total of 
Condition Factor + Total of Process Factor 4 'total of Mechanical Design Factor - 
Determine the Likelihood of Failure Catcgory: 






















Go to Figure 3.5.1 g 
NO º1 
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From Figure 3.5.1 c 
Chemical factor To measure chemical's inherent tendency to ignite . 
Should be based on 
the predominate or representative material in the stream Separate analysis should be 
performed if the unit has a number of different process streams 
Determine a "Flesh Factor" using NFPA Flammable Hazard Rating (the Red 
diamond on the NFPA Hazard ldentifiwtton System Sign) - Enter the NFPA 
Reactivity Hazard Rating 
Determine a "Reactivity Factor" using the NFPA Reactivity tlazard Rating System 
(the Yellow diamond on the NFPA Hazard Identification System Sign) - Enter the 




1 2 3 4 
9 12 15 
2 10 
_ 12 15 20 
3 12 15 18 ?S 
4 13 15 20 25 
Quantity Fador. To determine possible largest amount of material which could be released 
from a umt in a single scenario 
For amount material rdeased, use the largest amount of flammable inventory that can be 
lost in a single leak event: 
Material Rekased Qwntity Factor 
, 1000 pnund, 15, 
IK2K pounds 20 
2K 10K pounds 25 
IGK-30K pounds 28 
30K-808 unrh 31 
808-200K pounds 34 
200K-700K nds 37 
7Wi(-jmjjlion pounds 39 
12rnillion ountls aI 
2 l0million pounds 45 
> 10mdhon units 50 
State Factor: To indicate the fluid's tendency to vaporim and disperse when released into 
the environment 
Select stale factor lased on the normal (atmospheric pressure) toiling temperature in deg 
F 





abow 400 .3 
Autoignition Factor Penalty applied to fluid that is processed at a ternpaatum above its 
autoiguibon temperatun; 
Al- -10, for pcocesscd fuid blow its AIT 
AF are listed as below in the table, for processed fluid above its AIT (it is based on the 
normal boiling point of the fluid. 
Boili point Ideg F Aut ignition factm 
below 11) 3 
Oto300 7 
ebove 300 13 




Aut ignition Factw 
3 







Total of Quantity 
Factor 







Go to Figure 3.5.1 c 
N 
From Figure 3.5.1d 
Pressure Factor: To represent the fluid's tendency to be released quickly, resulting 
in a greater chance of instantaneous-type effects 
H 
T 
Credit factor: Product of scvcral subfactors of engineered systems in place which can 
reduce the damage from an event 
CF1 --l, gas detection in place which would detect 50% or more of incipient Teaks, 
otherwise CIA 0 
(1 2-1, process equipment is normally operated under an inert atmosphere, 
otherwise CF2 0 
PRI'--10, fluid is liquid inside die equipment 
PRF-40, fluid is a gas inside the equipment, and at a pressure of greater than 
l Sopsig 
PR! - 15, neither of the above are true 
otherwise CF2 =0 
CF3 I, fire fighting systems arc secure in the event of major incident, otherwise 
CF3 =O 
Isolation capability of the equipment in this area can be control remotely, AND: 
CF4--I, the isolation and associated instrumentation is protected from fires and 
explosions 
CF4 -1, the isolation and associated instrumentation is protected from tires only 
CF4 --I, no protection for the isolation capability from fires and explosions 
CF5--I, there arc blast walls around die most critical (typically highest pressure; ) 
equipment, otherwise CF5 () 
or more of the material in 5 minutes or less, with 90%reliahilty, otherwise CF6=0 
ICP6=-1, there is a dump, drain or blowdown sysin which will dcinvcn i 75% 1 
CI--'9 I, there is a fixed foam system in place, otherwise CP9 -0 
FT 1, thin is fireproofing in place on both structures and cables 
F7-0.95, there is fireproofing on either structures or cables 
Lc F7=0, neither of the above are true 
r CI 8 1, there is a fire water supply which will last at least 4 hours, otherwise 
L crx o 
umý cxhuYwisc CFI0-0 
ICI-'10--I, 
there are firewater monitors which can reach all areas ofthe affected 
Total Damagc 
Conscqurnce 
Calculate Total Damage Consequence Category: 
Total Chemical Factor - Total Quantity Factor r Total State 
Factor + Total Autoignition Factor i Total Pnssurc Factor 
Total Credit Factor_ 



























Go to Eigurt, 3.5.1 f 
YES 
NO 
Go to Figure 3.5. Ig 
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Toxic Quantity: To measure of both the quantity of the chemical and its toxicity 
STEPI TQFI 
For amount of chemical released, use the largest amount of toxic inventory that can be lost in a 
single luik event ýww«ý n'ký+ýä4. mnr r Ia 
Identification System: 
MIVA toýkay. ýoafo. 
ý]OOOWu^ýL", ss 
. _-__------- ýý-ýnýc ýýým 7n 
lDýl_GOK W_ umis 27 
. aIi Inill, nn ountls 33 
ý 2000 v. -ck. 
IC-10( pnunm 
'. Ipmcý IGillOK {wu_mis 
_ 
al mn ountls ý- 
STE112 TQP2 




. T. _. __ 
l) spcrsihility Factor: To measure the ability of the material to disperse, at typical process 
conditions 
DIF is dtxffrnincd from bdow tabic. 






LiD: 00 0.1 
]00300 0.01. 
. tm e n3 
-s ------- --------_ 
Credit Factor: Accounts for safety features that reduce the consequences of a toxic release by 
detection, isolation, and mitigation 
CRFI _ I, there are detectors in place for the process fluid of interest that would detect 50% or 
Cmore 
of incipient leaks, otherwise CRF 1=0 
CRF2 -1, major vessels containing this material can be isolated automatically, and isolation is 
initiated from a high reading from a toxic material detector 
CRF2 -5, isolation is remote with a manual initiation 
CRF2=-25, isolation is manually operated only 
CRF2- 0 neither 
_of 
the ahove are true- 
-- 
CRF3--5, that is a system in place that has proven to be effective in mitigating at least 90% of 
the fluid 
, otha wise 
CRF3-1 
Population Factor: To measure the potential number of people that can be affected by the toxic 
event 
Estimate population factor from below table. 'I'bis is based on the number of people, on the 
average, within onc-yuancr mile of the release point. Consider both onsite and offsite 
populations Within the plant boundaries, use daytime population counts 
M. Nn of Avplr ýf in 1/4 mAtr.! ý 
do 
_ mým 
, ro, aoo 
, mo-, oaoo - 
T Calculate Total Health Consequence Category: 
Total Quantity Factor + Total Dispersibility Factor 








tat I Icalth Const: qucncc Catti-gory: 
Neann Conn -aMh Consequenoe CDt 
ýl0 A 










I Total of 


















From Figure 3.5.1c 
X" ' 
ýx u From Figure 3.5. If 
V/ 
From Figure 3.5.1c 
Cheek 'Cotal Damage Consequence 
V 
-1 
Check Total Health Consequence 
Total Health Consequence > Total 
Damage Consequence 
Category of Total Health Consequence - 
Consequence of Failure 
Consequence of 
Category of Total Damage Consequence = 










1 Risk Ranking 
Figure 3.5. lg 
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3.5.2 RBI Semi-Quantitative Risk Analysis Framework 
Enter representative material 
contained in equipment being 
evaluated 
Enter the inventory category for 
the equipment (refer Table 1) 
Enter the inventory value as the 
midpoint of the range, or as 
calculated value 
Enter detection rating applicable 
to the detection systems present in 
the area (refer Table A. 2) 
Enter isolation rating applicable to 
the isolation systems present in the 
area (refer Table A. 2) 
r Estimate the leak duration based on hole sizes 










Go to Figure 3.5.2b 
Go to Figure 3.5.2d 
H 
28 
From Figure 3.52a 
ý 
of the gas at temperature Calculate K 
given 
Start 
Enter the process [ 
temperature 














Determine the release 
duration based on 
initial flow rate 
ý 
Instantaneous j 
Enter the boiling point of the 
fluid at atmospheric pressure 
Determine the phase of the fluid 





inventory of equipment 
it tiow rate > 
100001bs 
:-., 
- y_ Enter the boiling point of the 
fluid at atmospheric pressure 
T 
I 
Determine the phase of the fluid 
after the release 
Continuous 
PHASE 
Release duration by taking the 
lesser value between estimated 
Icak duration and time required to 




To Figure 3.5.2e 
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Go to Figure 3.5.2k 
Figure 3.5.2c 




From Figurc 3.5.2a 
-- -7- -- Cl, 
nstantanLous 
CC-lltinuous 
Enter the boiling point of the 
fluid at atmospheric pressure 
Instantaneous \/ Continuous 
I)etennine the phase of the fluid I)e: tennine the phase of the fluid 
aller the release, 
I 
L_ after the release 
ý-- --- _T_ 
) PKASE 
\ý 
f flow rate 
I0000Ibs 
%ý 
I3nter the boiling point of the 






Release duration = 
inventory of equipment 
Release duration by taking the 
lesser value between estimated 
leak duration and time required to 
deinventory based on initial flow 
rates 
Figure 3.5.2d 
Go to Figure 3.5.2e 
1 
Refer to 
Table A. I 
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From Figure 3.5.2b 
Frone Figurc 3.5.2d 
Start 
2 uocs tnmmn 
corrosion cxist? 
From Figure 3.5.2g 
NO 
From Figurc 3.5.2h 
\ 
From Figure 3.5.2j 






Calculate adjusted release rate s or 
mass (Refer to Table A. 4- Table 
A. 7) 
Calculate equipment 
damage area (Refer to 
Table A. 4- Table A. 7) 
-P 
Calculate potential area of fatalities 
(i 
Go to Figure 3.5.2f 
\ I -- 
,, 
YES º 
Go to Figure 3.5.2h 
YES 
Go to Figure 3.5.2c 
Figure 3.5.2e 
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(GEN or LOC) 
Time 
_--- [ Inspoction 
effectiv(mcss 
Determine category tör general 



















Go to Figure 4.21 a) 
ý, 
From Figure 4.21(b), 4.2t(c), 4.2(d), 
4.2(c), 4.2(f)4.2f(g), 4.2t(h), 4.2t(i) 









Go to Figure 3 2C(b) 









s fr= n-utcr Wiui 
N2 S prescm7 
. 
NU 
the process stet 
co nain HHF? 
9thep 
contaut 112S an( 
hydrogen? 
Is the operating 
nperature > 400 
_if 











Go to Figme 3.2Qt) 
1} 
Go to Figure 3.2Rg) 
D 
YES 
Go to Figw 3.2[Ch} 
a 
Go to Fgiae 3.2 f(i) 




s free water present in the 
process stream (including 
initial condensng 




G. to Figure 3.2f(d) 
iD 
Go to Figure 3-2f(c) 
From Figure 3.2f(a) 















300 scncs stainless steel 
s the material carbon stccl of 
7 Ikwrminc corrosion rate for carbon steel and 300 






I)c: tcrmine pH ofl CI 
ý C water I 
`onccntration 
L- 













































From Figure 3.5.217a) 
--_L- -- 






As the match 
alloy B-2? 
YES 
<--Does acid contain 
ß gcn or oxidant? 
Use corrosion 
rate from table .4 
NO 
YES 







Figure 35.2f (c) 
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Go to Figure 3.5.2f 




rate from table 
Determine maximum estimated corrosion 
rates 
c th malm 








Figure 3.5.2f (d) 
YES 
ý 
)ocs acid contain 










Go to Figure 3.5.2f 
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- --- r 
YES 
Does acid contain' 
oxygen or oxidant? 
"ý 
/ Use corrosion rate 
from table 
I 
Consult a corrosion specialist 
for estimated corrosion rate 
Go to Figure 3.5.2f 
Figure 3.5.2f (e) 
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/ 




Is the material of 
C/ > 



















Is the matenal oý 
Determine 
400? ,... .. _ literature 
1/1 imm nuhhcheA 
I rnrrnclnn rate 






Go to Figtrc 3.5.2f 
Figure 3.5.2f (f) 
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or Kp factor 
hl 






Figure 3.5.2f (g) 
ý 
Go to Figure 3.2f 
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From Figure 3.5.2f(a) 
1 --- ------1 
\, / 
-- -7 















Is the material of 
<--construction 
carbon or alloy YES 
ý\\\ JIVI. ý: 





Go to Figure 3.5.2f 
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Go to Figure 3.5.2f 
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From Figure 3.5.21' 
ý 
YES 
k? ües it contain an injecliort/-, 
mix point? ý 
las a hiehlv effective--, - `nspection for injection point > YES º 
egrrosion been performe1? ' 
NO 
--ý- 
Multiply TMSF (GEN 







contain a '> - NO 
caJlcgy 
YES 
























































From Figurc 3.5.2c 
ýJ 
/Is the material of . f 




Scrccn for caustic, amine, 
SSC, 111C/ 
SOI IIC, carironate 
cracking 
Dctcrminc susceptibility 
for cacti potential SCC 
mechanism for carbon 
and low alloy steels 
oyouknowUe 












Screen for PTA, 
CISCC 
Determine 






lave you detected SCC in th 


















for all potential 





Go to Figure 3.5.2j 
/ 

























Go to Figure 3.5.2e 
Figure 33.2j 
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Enter generic failure 
frequency 
T 
Calculate sum of failure 
frequencies 
Calculate fraction contribution for each hole 
size by dividing the hole size generic frequency 












3.6 RBI Tool Development by Using Visual Basic Application 
Figure 3: Start Window 
cr egaiprarf neohas "this nsprc*bn? 
myer egdipmanfe 
I F-k- 1I.,. i1 V. r 
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Creep darcge is ccctr ng nh gh trrpu'a+ve preeas-. 
! Na-ar aIsdrpraacticr (rccFcn rmt g: r prc GI'cst 4crmaran, c«-iv tc+icn: rphrraidiza* ani 
cetartrapFc br'-tls jaCvr e 
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Y-k.. iFý.: m" 1I". il Vrl 
.... ý w.. 
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NEXT 
Figure 4: Equipment Factor and Damage Factor for Likelihood Analysis 
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Figure 5: Inspection Factor for Likelihood Analysis 
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Figure 6: Condition Factor for Likelihood Analysis 
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Figure 7: Process Factor for Likelihood Analysis 
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Figure 8: Mechanical Design Factor for Likelihood Analysis 
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Figure 11: Chemical Factor, Quantity Factor and State Factor for Consequence Analysis 
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Figure 13: Credit Factor for Consequence Analysis 
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Figure 15: Quantity and Toxicity Factor for Health Consequence Analysis 
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3.7 Trial Test on Several Case Studies 





The results from developed RBI Tool are compared to the results from other RBI Tool Software 
in the industry as the benchmark. The benchmark's system is essentially an implementation of 
the methodology described in API 581. The approach is semi-quantitative with separate 
calculation being performed for the likelihood and consequence components for each item of the 
plant. The results are reported on a 5x5 matrix with likelihood category of I to 5 and the 
consequence category A to F. Thus, the lowest risk category is IA and the highest risk category 
5F. Likelihood analysis is based on the assessment of each of the damage mechanisms and a 
probability of failure can be determined from the product of a generic failure frequency, the 
damage factor is based on guidance in API 581 and covers areas including leadership and 
administration, management of change, operating procedures, safe working practices and 
training. For mechanisms where data is limited, the guidance in the API technical modules is 
used. The damage factor for any given mechanism is in turn dependent on the effectiveness of 
the inspection for that mechanism. Bayes theorem is used to derive a quantitative inspection 
effectiveness value from a qualitative inspection category. Thus, for a fairly effective inspection 
procedure (the true damage state is correctly identified 50% of the time) the damage factor and 
thus the probability of failure increase. A quantitative evaluation of the likelihood of failure in 
terms of events per year can thus be obtained. Consequence analysis is based on knowledge of 
the equipment damage, fatality and toxicity areas, the number of outage days together with 
generic cost data. Consequence data are calculated for a range of hole sizes and weighted based 
on generic data for the failure frequency for each hole size and the total failure frequency for the 
equipment item. Risk tolerability criteria are established for each case based on financial and 
safety risks together with other influences such as applicable regulations, local sensitivities and 
the legal environment. These criteria establish a target risk level. 
This information is obtained from Risk Based Inspection -A Case Study Evaluation of 
Onshore Process Plant by W Geary. 
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Two case studies (Refer to Appendix B) have been run on the developed RBI Tool. The 
comparison between the results from the developed RBI Tool and the benchmark are as follows: 
CASE 1: Molecular Sieve Vessel 
Qualitative Analysis Benchmark 
Likelihood Rank 3 3 
Consequence Rank E D 
Risk Medium High High 
CASE 2: Autoclave 
Qualitative Analysis Benchmark 
Likelihood Rank 5 2 
Consequence Rank D A 
Risk High Low 
For the developed R13I Tool, in likelihood category, there are six factors are evaluated that will 
affect the likelihood of a large leak. Each factor is weighted, and their combination results in the 
likelihood factor. The six subfactors that make up the likelihood category are as follows: 
" The likelihood equipment factor (EF) - is related to the number of components on the 
unit that have the potential to fail. The EF has a maximum of 15 points. 
" The likelihood damage factor (DF) - is a measure of the risk that associated with known 
damage mechanisms in the unit. These mechanisms include levels of general corrosion, 
fatigue cracking, low temperature exposure, and high-temperature degradation. This 
factor receives a maximum value of 20 points in the overall assessment. 
" The likelihood in inspection factor (IF) - provides a measure of the effectiveness of the 
current inspection programme and its ability to identify the active or anticipated damage 
mechanism in the unit. It examines the types of inspections, their thoroughness, and the 
management of the inspection programme. The factor is weighted with negative numbers 
because the quality of the inspection program will partially offset the likelihood of failure 
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inherent in damage mechanism from damage factors. The maximum weight for the 
inspection factor is 15 points. 
" The likelihood of condition factor (CCF) - accounts for the physical condition of the 
equipment from a maintenance and housekeeping perspective. A simple evaluation is 
performed on the apparent condition and upkeep of the equipment from a visual 
examination. The CCF has a maximum value of 15 points. 
" The likelihood process factor (PF) - is a measure of the potential for abnormal operations 
or upset conditions to initiate a sequence leading to a loss of containment. It is a function 
of the number of shutdowns or process interruptions (planned or unplanned), the stability 
of the process, and the potential for failure of protective devices because of plugging or 
other causes. The PF is weighted at maximum 15 points. 
" The likelihood mechanical damage factor (MDF) - measures the safety factor within the 
design of the unit whether it is designed to current standards, and how unique, complex, 
or innovative the unit design is. The MF is weighted at 15 points. 
for consequence category, there are seven elements are combined: 
" The consequence chemical factor (CF) -a chemical's inherent tendency to ignite, is 
derived as a combination of the material's flash factor and its reactivity factor. Flash 
factors correspond to the material's NFPA I Class rating, while the reactivity factor is a 
function of how readily the material can explode when exposed to an ignition source. 
" The consequence quantity factor (QF) - represents the largest amount of material that 
could reasonably be expected to be released from a unit in single event. The factor is 
based on the largest mass (in pounds) of flammable inventory in the unit. 
" The consequence state factor (SF) - is a measure of how readily a material will flash to a 
vapour when it is released to the atmosphere. It is determined from a ratio of the average 
process temperature to the boiling temperature at atmospheric pressure (using absolute 
temperatures in the ratio) 
" The consequence auto-ignition factor - is incorporated to account for the increased 
probability of ignition for a fluid released at a temperature above auto-ignition 
temperature. 
" The consequence pressure factor (PRF) - is a measure of how quickly the fluid can 
escape. 
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" The consequence credit factor (CRF) - is determined to account for the safety features 
engineered into the unit. These safety features can play a significant role in reducing the 
consequence of potentially catastrophic release. 
" The damage potential factor (DMF) - the potential for fire or explosion to cause damage 
to the equipment near large inventory or flammable or explosive materials. 
The damage consequence category is then found by combining the above consequence factors 
and selecting the category based on ranges of these combined factors. 
If there is health consequence, the following factors are considered: 
" The toxic quantity factor (TQF) - is a measure of both the quantity and the toxicity of a 
material. 
" The dispersibility factor (DIF) - is a measure of the ability of a material to disperse. It is 
determined directly from the normal boiling points of the material. The higher the boiling 
point, the less likely material is to disperse. 
" The credit factor (CRF) - is determined to account for the safety features engineered into 
the unit. 
" The population factor (PI'F) - is a measure of the number of people that can potentially 
be affected by a toxic release event. 
The health consequence category is then found by combining the above consequence factors and 
selecting the category based on ranges of these combined factors. 
The consequence categories (health and damage) are assigned letter scores, and the one with the 
higher value is considered for risk rating. 
For benchmark's system in case study 1, two separate analyses were performed, one for the 
process mode and one for the regeneration mode. Based on the inspections carried out in 1986, 
1992 and 2000 it was assumed that the thinning mechanism was of minor importance and a 
corrosion rate of 0.01 mm/year was assigned. Thus a thinning damage factor for the process 
condition was 1.7 and for the regeneration condition was 0.2. 
External pitting attack to a depth of 0.5 mm was found during the inspection in 2000 and it was 
assumed that a representative corrosion rate of 0.028 mm/year was appropriate. Based on this 
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- information an external damage factor of 1.7 and 0.2 was calculated for the process and 
regeneration modes respectively. 
Additional information was requested by the participant to allow calculations of stress corrosion 
cracking (SCC) to be carried out. The assessment for SCC was based on guidance presented in 
API 581. The susceptibility was derived from tables of pH and H2S content. The post-weld heat 
treated hardness (assumed) was also taken into account. On this basis the vessel was rated as not 
susceptible. The pH, H2S content and the sulphur level of the steel were used to determine the 
material susceptibility to hydrogen induced cracking (11IC) and stress oriented hydrogen induced 
cracking (SONIC), again from tables in API 581. This showed that the vessel had a low 
susceptibility to these mechanisms. 
These data produced a calculated likelihood of failure values of 6.5E-03 and 78E-05 per year for 
the process and regeneration modes respectively. For the purposes of this assessment a future 
risk evaluation target date of December 31st 2010 was assumed. This resulted in a change in the 
likelihood of failure values to 1.6E-02 and 7.8E-05 per year for the process and regeneration 
modes respectively. The regeneration likelihood data remained unchanged since no damage 
mechanisms are active. 
The assessment found that HIC was an active mechanism during the process phase, which led to 
the increase in the likelihood of failure, and proposed that a highly effective inspection method 
be used for this mechanism within the next 3 years. Highly effective was defined as a method 
that will correctly identify the anticipated degradation in 90% of cases. Specifically, an intrusive 
inspection of the surface area, 95% to 100% wet fluorescent magnetic particle (WFMP) with UT 
follow up of any indications. Alternatively, a non-intrusive inspection could be carried out using 
manual or automated UT of 95% to 100% of the external surface. 
The recommendation was based on the high risk outcomes especially for the future evaluation 
date. The high risk was primarily associated with the increase in likelihood of failure with time 
but also with the high consequences calculated. For the consequence analysis calculations, 
methane was chosen as the representative chemical and H2S as the toxic chemical. Look-up 
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methane was chosen as the representative chemical and H2S as the toxic chemical. Look-up 
tables were used to provide consequence solutions for small, medium and large holes and for 
complete rupture. Data was derived for the equipment damage area, the fatality area, the toxicity 
area, the number of outage days, the business interruption costs, the equipment damage costs and 
the safety costs. The results were weighted based on generic failure frequency data and a total 
cost was calculated as £58M. The majority of the consequence cost was associated with the 
flammability of methane rather than the toxic consequences of the H2S. The consequence costs 
were calculated separately for the regeneration mode and a value of £16M was obtained 
primarily associated with the lower regeneration pressure. 
For benchmark's system in case study 2, Corrosion and chloride SCC were considered to be the 
active damage mechanisms in this vessel. Based on the inspection results in 1987 and 1989 it 
was assumed that thinning phenomena were of minor importance. Therefore, a corrosion rate of 
0.01 mm/year was assigned. 
SCC was addressed using a cracking susceptibility option in the soffware. An external damage 
factor was calculated based on a limit state equation derived from structural reliability theory and 
linear elastic fracture mechanics. Since the jacket space had been inspected in 1987, the 
confidence in the external damage was fixed at 81.4%. The likelihood of failure, taking into 
account the damage factor and generic failure frequencies, was calculated to be 5.7E-04. 
The same calculation, based on 31/12/2010, gives an increase in the likelihood of failure to 9.8E- 
04. Thus a likelihood category of 2 was calculated. The consequence calculation was based on 
business interruption costs only on the grounds that PTFE represented a low fire hazard. A 
business interruption of 2 days and equipment damage costs of £22k was assumed, thus the total 
consequence costs were estimated to be £27k giving a consequence category of A. Therefore the 
risk associated with failure was assigned a "low" category. 
It was concluded that an inspection should not be carried out in the short term since the total risk 
was only slightly reduced and remained low at the future date. Thus it was recommended that the 
maximum inspection interval should be 10 years. An inspection plan was not submitted- 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
RBI Tool is developed by using published methodology from API 581. Risk analysis of the 
equipments is evaluated by considering the likelihood and consequence of failure. Only 
qualitative risk analysis is developed in this tool. The results of this analysis are validated by 
comparing to the benchmark. 
For difTerent RBI Tool analysis, the risks are slightly different. The amount of information being 
supplied to the different analysis levels is the main reason to this variation. The concept of each 
analysis level has been discussed in Chapter 3 of this report in order to identify the differences of 
these two RBI analysis levels. 
This developed RBI Tool is only a prototype. The methodology has followed the published 
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Table A. 1: Guidelines for Determining the Phase of a Fluid 
Phase of Flail at Steady-Statc Phase of Fluid at Steady-State Determination of Final Phase for 






nxxlel as gas 
model as gas 
nxxkl as gas unless the fluid boiling }riot at ambient 
condition is greater than *}"F, then model as a liquid 
model as liquid 
as 
liquid liquid 
Table A. 2: Detection and Isolation System Rating Guide 
Type of Detection Syucm Detection Classificatmn 
Instrumentation designed specifically to A 
detect material Losses by changes in operat- 
ing conditions (ie., loss of pressure or 
fl(yw) in the systern. 
Suitably located dcicckxs to detcmtine B 
when the material is ptscnt ouuidc the 
lxessumccolaining envelope. 
Visual detoctioo, cameras. or detccbrs C 
with marginal coverage 
Te of Isolation System Iu Iation Classification 
Isolation or shutdown systems activated A 
directly fmm process it>stnuncatatioa or 
detecuxs. with no opcrator inte vention. 
Isolation or shutdown systerns acti. mecd by B 
operators in the control room or other suit- 
able locations romotc from the leak. 
Isolation dependtmt on manuallyvpcratcd c 
vales 
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Table A. 3: Leak Durations Based on Detection and Isolation Systems 
Detection Isolatiam 
Systcm Rating system Rating Leak Duration 
AA 20 minutcs for 1/. inch leaks 
10 mewtcs for 1-inch leaks 
5 minutes for 4-inch leaks 
AR 30 minutes for /inch Iaks 
20 minutes for I-inch leaks 
10 minutes for 4-inch leaks 
AC 40 minutes fort/4-inch leaks 
30 mgtutes for 1-inch leaks 
20 minutes for 4-inch leaks 
BA or B 40 minutes for 1/4-inch Icaks 
30 minutcs for I -inch leaks 
20 minutes for 4-inch leaks 
BCI hour for 114-inch leaks 
30 mutes for t-inch leaks 
20 mines for 4-inch leaks 
C&B. aCt hour fur'/4-inch leaks 
40 minutes for I -inch leaks 
20 minutes for flinch leaks 
Table A. 4: Continuous Release Consequence Equations - Auto Ignition Not Likely' 
Final Phase Gras Fund Phase Liquid 
Material 










A- 43 xi', 9' 
A= 49 A498 
A252cu9e 
A- 29 . i)-98 
A= 110 A96 
A=1?. 5zo-' 
A= 62.1 Al In 
A= 68 xoý16 
A= 536 , i0-9O 
A= 182 A89 
A= 1544P, 4) 
A 
A= 373. ý-89 
As 183. P89 








A= 12 z8"98 A= 29 sO-'9f A= 130 A9) 
A= 64 P-90 
A=20xn. 90 
A=11jp-91 
112 A= 198 . ý0.992 A= 614 so. 933 
H2S A-32z1"°0 A=52r1m1 
HF 
Ammluics A= 121.39,103911 A- 359 i°. 8821 
Stycrne A- 12t. 39x°"11 A- 359's°-f1&'"1 
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Table A. 5: Instantaneous Release Consequence Equations -Auto Ignition Not Likely' 
Fatal Phase Gas Fatal Phase Liquid 
Material 
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Nick: Shadaf area reprrsen s cases in which oquations are nonapplicable. 
x= total release mass, lb. 
A- area. fl2. 
'Not likely if process tetnperature is less than auur ignition tcmpcratus plus WE 
Table A. 6: Continuous Release Consequence Equations - Auto Ignition Likel' 
Fatal Phase Gas Final Phase Liquid 
Matcrial 
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A=315. c1"0° 
A= 304. ý10° 
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A= 74.5 x4"92 
A= 837 
A= 811 
A- 828 s' . on 
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H, A-113ba1"at A=101. nn 




Shaded area tepmaws cases in which equations are uooapplicable. 
a= meal release rate, lb/sec. 
A= area. fl2. 
'Must he processed at least 8W F ahcwe am ignition temperuurc. 
A= 525 . 
A-95 A= 1315 
A= iG0095 A= 1401 tA. o 
A 102-Xx09= A 28.50 aO 9' 
A 861 P"`r A= 2420 ý°aU 
A= 544 . c{'-vu A= 1604 A° 
9C' 
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Table A. 7: Instantaneous Release Consequence Equations - Auto Ignition Likel' 
Final Physc (aus Final Phase Liquid 
Material 
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n67 A= 31(K) 
A= 1768. x0-63 
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Shaded area repmscnb caws in which equations are rnmapplicablc. 
x= trial release mass, Ib. 
A= area, ft2. 
'Must be processtd at least 80°F above auto ignition temperature. 
A=6. O. e-5z 












Molecular sieve vessel 
BACKGROUND/ADDIT[ONAL INFORMATION 
Molecular sieve vessel commissioned in 1982. Design standard BS 5500. Design 
thickness 107mm (actual 109mm), diameter 2374mm, length 16000mm. Corrosion 
allowance 4mm. Temperature: max design 350°C, min design --62°C, max op 320°C, 
min op 0°C. 
Pressure: max design 121 barg, min design 0 barg, max operating 115 barg, normal 
operating 1 10 barg. 
Assessment Details 
Likelihood Information 
Number of units and One of four sister vessels 
type of plant. 
2 Plant function: Molecular sieve vessel 
3 Plant processes: Natural gas: absorb H2S and H2O 
Process 110 barg, 6°C 
Regeneration using hot gases at 70 barg at 310°C. 
4 Process stability: Continuous treatment process alternating between absorption 
at 6 Deg C and regeneration at 310 Deg C. 
Process is considered stable. 
7) Material of construe- Low temperature Carbon steel 
tion: Grade BS 1501-225-4908-LT62 
6 Damage mecha- Internally: General corrosion 
nisnrs: Pitting corrosion 
Hydrogen induced cracking 
Sulphide SCC 
Externally: General corrosion 
Pitting corrosion 
Bottom dished end is internally protected by SS thermal shield 
-tals. 
7 Design standards_ BSSSOO 
K Inspection: 1986 Partial visual internal - good condition, light millscale in 
some isolated areas 
Wl 
1992 100% internal - 19 surface breaking linear flaws in 
ground weld caps, removed by light grinding, considered to be 
from manufacture (slag lines). 
2000 External. Coating and insulation material removed - light 
surface corrosion, isolated areas of rust scaling. Pitting to 
0.5mm depth. Nozzles and shell welds including skirt to shell - 
MPl - no defects. 
2000 Internal (non intrusive). 16% surface area UT scans for in- 
ternal pitting - shell, dome ends, all nozzles - no defects. Wall 
thickness measurements satisfactory. 
Upper (1992) internal support ring weld UT scanned 100% cir- 
cumference and lower original ring 25% circumference and no 
defects were detected. 
9 Plant maintenance 1992 Additional grid and support beams welded into vessel 
history: 
2000 Vessel totally delagged for refurbishment of coating and 
insulation material. 
10 Process protection Unit 2600 is protected by a pressure control valve, high pressure 
devices: trip, primary relief valves and secondary relief valves sized in 
accordance with API RP 520. 
This vessel is protected by three relief valves. 
Consequence Information 
1I Fire: Emergency response procedures. 
External fire fighting resources would be required for the most 
serious event. 
12 Incident mitigation: II2S and flammable gas detection. 
ESD and blowdown facilities. 
Control of ignition sources. Hazardous Area classification re- 
duces the ignition probability of unignited vapour releases. The 
hazardous area classification zone 2 (IIZS) covers the whole 
U2600 area. The surrounding area is categorised Zone 2 for 
hydrocarbon releases. 
Firewater for cooling. An auto deluge system is provided to 
process vessels. There are a number of hydrants that may also 
be used. 
Firewater fed via electric and diesel fire pumps from site fire- 
pond. 
Finergency response procedures. 
13 Chemical data. Predominantly methane gas - explosive within explosive range 
in air. 
14 Quantit : 7.5 tonnes 
1 
- 
Chemical state: Hydrocarbon gas with trace amounts of U2S and water. 
16 Commercial damage 
1 
Failure would result in moderate total cost (system shut down 
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potential: resulting in a reduced throughput and significant repair costs. 
17 Toxicity: Toxic fluids: >0.5 tonnes. Materials on very short exposure 
could result in death or major injury. 
H2S area authorisation in place. Gas detection and emergency 
procedures in place- 





Vessel manufactured in 1980. 
Design temperature 100°C, design pressure 25.85 Barg 
Operating temperature 8°C to 95°C (75°C to 50°C jacket), operating pressure 10 Barg 
(2.75 Barg jacket). 
Vessel dimensions: 5'0" dia. x1 l'0" long SS reactor vessel I" wall thickness. 
Flanged jacket 3/8" thick. Carbon Steel. 
Assessment Details 
Likelihood Information 
1 Number of units and Single unit PTFE reactor and cooling water jacket 
type of lant: 
2 Plant function: 
3 Plant processes: Reactor filled with water at 75°C and pressure tested to 10 Barg. The pressure is 
released, water is then agitated and a vacuum pulled to evacuate air from the ul- 
lage space. 'llie ammonium sulphate solution catalyst is then injected. TFE is in- 
troduced as a gas and is immediately polymerised through water. The temperature 
of the exothermic reaction is controlled by the cooling water jacket; initially at a 
temperature of 75°C. reducing to 15°C. 
4 Process stability: Batch process, 3 cycles/day x 48 weeks/year. No process excur- 
sions 
5 Material of construe- 321 Stainless steel (carbon steel jacket) 
Lion: 
6 Damage meclia- Stress Corrosion Cracking. 
nisnis: 
Jacket cooling water Chloride readings- 12 ppm. 
It is within the temperature susceptibility range for -Stress Cor- 
rosion Cracking. > 60 deg C. 
In the event of a leak the cooling water recirculates, at the point of discharge it is 
dray i into a cubicle any PTFF, present would be picked up by sensitive 'sniffers' 
(IPPM) 
Any small leak would render pulling a vacuum, essential element of each batch 
process, impossible. 
Fatigue and jacket into ace corrosion considered no problems to date 
7 Design standards: BS5500 
8 Inspection: ; cnerally very sound. 
Main problems caused by mechanical damage from agitator. Fell in 
1997, surface crack detection revealed nothing significant. 
Some scarring little worse than scratches 0.5 mm deep. 
Branch welds not high integrity some original manufacturing defects 
identified and repaired. 
following 'decomposition' in 1989, extensive surface crack detection 
revealed no problems. 
Failure of Jacket bolts in 1987 misalignment caused fatigue. Unusual but 
not repeated! 
Jacket space examined in 1987 found satisfactory. 
9 Plant maintenance No repairs or modifications other than those reported under Section 8 
histor : 
I0 Process Protection The relief streams have never been blocked or restricted. The sys- 
devices: tem has a bursting disc. 
Consequence Information 
II Fire: No external fire fighting services would be required. 
12 Incident mitigation: Gas detection systems are strategically placed in the missile proof 
cubicle in which it resides. 
13 Chemical data: Low fire hazard with PTFE. 
14 Quantity: The worst event would be a leak before break situation from the reactor to the 
jacket. This would be picked up by sniffer systems on the water discharge within 
the cubicle. 
15 Chemical state: Not applicable for PTFE. 
16 Commercial damage Business interruption cost £3k/day. 
potential: Replacement cost £30k 
17 Toxicity: Exposure to fume can lead to short term influenza type systems 
lasting 48 hours. 
18 Population: 1(X) people within 500m of release (on site and off site). 
I- 
Appendix C 
Table C. 1: Degradation Mechanisms, Causes and Inspection Methods 
Degradanon Causes bupecnon dfcrirods 
Lfechmnsnt 
Uniform and Exposure to corrosive material such as mineral or carbonic acids or aqueous Visual Inspection (VT). direct 
localized conosion eKlroiuiicilts, seawater and 
humid or condensing a vuoiniicrrts Damage call mcasuicuicnt (DM) and 
be localized over an area and is accelerated by exposure to alicinating lint illy Ultrasonic Testing (LT) 
conditions, increases in corrosive specie concentration. temperature. oxygell 
content of the fluid and the large cathodic anodic surface area ratios in 
contact with the fluid. 
Pitting Exposure to corrosive material such as mineral or carbonic acids or aqueous VT. DhI 
environments, seawater and humid or condensing enviro1mlents. Dunnage can 
be localized over all area or uniform distributed Surface in contact P: itli the 
aqueous phase. Conoiiou rates can be much higher than uniform or localized 
corrosion. 
Crevice corrosion Electrochemical concentration cell set up associated ill crevice areas with VT and DM 
stagnant aqueous phrase fluids. Such as wide sliillge. sand. biological 
materials or corrosion products. failed coatings. gasket surfacev, bolt heads 
and riveted lap joints. Dansaae is usually found within the crevice ar"ca. 
Erosion High fluid velocity in piping or inlpingerncut on a surface. accelerated by VT. UT and Radiography 
solids in the stream Testire (RI 
Fatigue cracking Cyclic loading coupled with an initiating location caused by a stress riser. Surface flan' detection. UI 
weld defect. arc strike. mechanical. corrosion d issa2e or environmentally- flaw methods. RT 
induced cracking 
Eisvirorrllenfally Exposure to specific agents that cause enviioiunentally-induced cracking Stich Surface flaw detection. UT 
induced cracking as caustic and aqueous. phases with hydrogen sulfide flaw methods. RT 
Creep Temperature exposure coupled with appropriate stress damage is exposure VT and DM 
lime dependent. for most steels short term exposure generally above 1 200-F 
is of concern 
High temperature Prolonged temperature exposure generally above 1000-F. damage is exposure VT. DM and 
oxidation and time dependent. or rapid cooling from above 1300-F in a fire situation. nictallographically. PMI 
Metallurgical 
Changes 
Brittle Fracture Low temperature exposure and appropriate stress condition. either applied or None. inherent property of 
from the ial stresses. Enhanced by internal of external defect. material. enhanced by external 
and internal defects 
Mechanical Impact or abrasive loading Vf. RT 
damage 
(Resource: ABS, 2003) 
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